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ESSAYS
SECULAR FUNDAMENTALISM
PaulF. Campos*
Government is a true religion. It has its dogmas, its mysteries, its
priests. To submit it to the discussion of each individual is to
destroy it. It is given life only by the reason of the nation, that is
by a political faith, of which it is a symbol.
-Joseph de Maistre'

I. AFTER

THEORY

Near the beginning of his influential book After Virtue, Alasdair
MacIntyre notes that "[tihe most striking feature of contemporary moral
utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the
most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their interminable character."2 The interminable character of
modem moral dispute is a product of the fact that "[t]here seems to be no
rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture."3 MacIntyre
proceeds to give several examples of such disputes, one of which, concerning the legal and moral status of abortion, is particularly relevant to
some of the claims put forth in John Rawls's Political Liberalism.
MacIntyre asks us to consider the following "characteristic and wellknown rival moral arguments."
(a) Everybody has certain rights over his or her own person, including his or her own body. It follows from the nature of these
rights that at the stage when the embryo is essentially part of the
mother's body, the mother has a right to make her own uncoerced decision on whether she will have an abortion or not.
Therefore abortion is morally permissible and ought to be allowed by law.
(b) I cannot will that my mother should have had an abortion
when she was pregnant with me, except perhaps if it had been
certain that the embryo was dead or gravely damaged. But if I
cannot will this in my own case, how can I consistently deny to
others the right to life that I claim for myself? I would break the
so-called Golden Rule unless I denied that a mother has a gen* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B. 1982, M.A. 1983,

J.D. 1989, University of Michigan.
1. Joseph de Maistre, Oeuvres Completes deJ. de Maistre 376 (1884-87), quoted in
Isaiah Berlin, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism [hereinafter Berlin, Origins of
Fascism], in The Crooked Timber of Humanity 91, 125-26 (1990) [hereinafter The
Crooked Timber of Humanity].
2. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 6 (2d ed. 1984).

3. Id.
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eral right to an abortion. I am not of course thereby committed
to the view that abortion ought to be legally prohibited.
(c) Murder is wrong. Murder is the taking of an innocent life.
An embryo is an identifiable individual, differing from a newborn infant only in being at an earlier stage on the long road to
adult capacities and, if any life is innocent, that of an embryo is.
If infanticide is murder, as it is, abortion is murder. So abortion4
is not only morally wrong, but ought to be legally prohibited.
What characteristics do such arguments share that help make contemporary moral disputes in our culture so shrill and intractable?
MacIntyre concentrates on two in particular. First, the arguments display
what philosophers of science call "conceptual incommensurability." That
is, although each argument is logically valid in that its conclusions do
indeed flow from its premises, the rival premises themselves must at some
point be taken as axiomatic. This would seem to make it impossible to
measure the claims of each position against its rivals. In MacIntyre's hypothetical discourse, premises that invoke rights collide with premises
that invoke moral universalizability; and, given the internal consistency of
the arguments, there appear to be no objective criteria available for
choosing between them.
MacIntyre's second point helps explain the significance of the first.
These arguments all "purport to be impersonal rational arguments and as
such are usually presented in a mode appropriate to that impersonality." 5
Statements of value claim to be about something other than the preferences of those who make them: such propositions depend on our assent
to some moral imperative, the validity of which is supposedly independent of the beliefs of the person who happens to be making the argument. The interminable character of modern moral argument is thus a
direct consequence of a kind of pragmatic contradiction. Moral claims at
least appear to be in some fundamental sense subjective. One cannot,
given the current epistemological obscurity of such claims, demonstrate
that a woman's "right" to procreative autonomy is superior to an embryo's "right" not to be aborted; in the end, all such claims must have the
flavor of arbitrary assertions. The advocate's belief in any particular
moral position is therefore ultimately a matter of choosing to believe one
claim rather than another. Yet the moral claims themselves continue to
be made in language that appeals to objective standards of judgment.
Hence what might be explained away as a clash of antagonistic wills takes
place in a vocabulary that not only demands rational assent, but does so
precisely in those matters where we cannot adduce any grounds for compelling such agreement.
After Virtue is perhaps the most celebrated of recent attempts to
grapple with what various modern thinkers have come to regard as the
disastrous consequences of enlightenment rationalism for all types of eth4. Id. at 6-7.
5. Id. at 8.
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ical discourse. Yet PoliticalLiberalism does not merely ignore MacIntyre's
work: the book does not even acknowledge the existence of any counterenlightenment tradition in Western political thought. Indeed, if a
reader's knowledge of moral and political philosophy were limited to Professor Rawls's 400-page reply to the immense literature that has grown up
around A Theory ofJustice, that reader would conclude that the fundamental premises of liberal political theory were essentially incontestable. It
should, I think, take us aback when we discover that a book written by
one of the pre-eminent philosophers in the English-speaking world-a
book, moreover, which attempts to describe definitively the proper place
for comprehensive moral theories in modern life-does not refer to the
work of Marx, Nietzche, Kierkegaard, or Heidegger, or indeed to any major European social philosopher who postdates Kant and Hegel.6 Even if
such omissions can be credited to the institutional parochialism of AngloAmerican analytical philosophy, what are we to make of the failure to
engage directly with many of the powerful criticisms of liberal ideology in
general, and of Rawls's work in particular, that have been made by
MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and others, or to answer Robert Nozick's hyperliberal attack on the liberal welfare state?7 Faced with
such apparent complacency, certain critics have begun to ask a provocative question: what features of contemporary liberalism tend to make
some of its academic champions so illiberal in their unwillingness to treat
8
fundamental disagreement with their views seriously?
In this Essay, I argue that Political Liberalism's central concept of
"public reason" is empty, and that Rawls's analysis of political issues
amounts to little more than the shamanistic incantation of the word "reasonable." Specifically, as his discussion of abortion exemplifies, Rawls
simply declares that some position is "reasonable" and then condemns
6. This statement is not quite true: Jurgen Habermas is mentioned in a footnote.
7. See MacIntyre, supra note 2; Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? (1988); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)
[hereinafter Sandel, Liberalism]; Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (1989); Robert Nozick,
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Rawls does respond to one of Sandel's basic criticisms

by emphasizing that the original position as set forth in A Theory of Justice is only a
representational device and should not be understood to imply "a particular metaphysical
conception of the person; for example, that the essential nature of persons is independent
of and prior to their contingent attributes" (p. 27). For Sandel's perspective on the
evolution of Rawls's theory see Sandel's review of PoliticalLiberalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765
(1994).
8. See, for example, Peter Berkowitz's excellent review of Stephen Holmes's The
Anatomy of Antiliberalism:

It is incumbent upon liberals and their friends to state that Holmes does
liberalism no favors by flattering liberal vanities. Given the partiality and
incompleteness of all things fashioned by human hands, it is doubtful that the
principles of liberalism are secure when its champions are unable to discover
anything of value about its weak points and unwise tendencies from [critics such
as MacIntyre.]
Peter Berkowitz, Liberal Zealotry, 103 Yale L.J. 1363, 1382 (1994).
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opposing views for being not merely wrong, but contrary to the dictates of
reason. The term "reasonable" thus serves the same performative funcdon in Rawls's theory as that served by the term "God" in dogmatic religious argument. I then attempt to place Rawls's style of liberal belief in
historical context, and I suggest that the success of this particular creed is
best understood in essentially sociological terms.
II.

MORAL INCOMMENSURABILITY AND THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON

Although it is of course extremely complex in its details, the central
argument of Political Liberalism is fairly straightforward. According to
Rawls, liberal theory faces a conundrum: "How is it possible that there
may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines?" (p. xxv). The conundrum arises because Rawlsian liberalism
posits that the supreme political value of social life is that people should
have the freedom to make their own choices; 9 however, those very
choices will inevitably prove incompatible with the choices of other persons who do not share the same reasonable religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines. How is the state to decide which of these conflicting
choices will be rewarded or prohibited without at the same time illegitimately interfering with the overriding moral imperative of allowing all
persons to have "an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all"1 0-that
is, to enjoy a political regime that allows them the freedom to make autonomous moral choices based on their own comprehensive belief systems? To resolve such conflicts, political liberalism needs some criterion
of choice that is not itself the product of what Bawls characterizes as a
reasonable comprehensive doctrine, for such a criterion would necessitate privileging one reasonable comprehensive doctrine over all the
others.1"
Rawls's solution involves sharply distinguishing between the types of
discourse which are appropriate to the public and nonpublic spheres in
social life. When citizens decide really important questions-those involving "constitutional essentials" (p. 214)-they cannot invoke reasons
drawn exclusively from their reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but
only from what Rawls terms "public reason":
9. This value, which Rawls describes as "the priority of the right over the good" is the
central moral assertion of Kantian ethics, and ofRawls's A Theory ofJustice. SeeJohn Rawls,
A Theory ofJustice (1971) [hereinafter A Theory ofJustice].
10. A Theory of Justice, supra note 9, at 302. Political Liberalism rephrases the
principle so as to emphasize its political nature (p. 5).
11. [W]e try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any particular
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral view, or its associated theory of
truth and the status of values ... we hope to make it possible for all to accept the
political conception as true or reasonable from the standpoint of their own
comprehensive view, whatever it may be. (P. 150.)
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[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected
to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of
legitimacy. (P. 137.)
This idea, as Rawls acknowledges, draws from the tradition in democratic
theory that traces its roots to Rousseau's social contract, especially that
thinker's concept of the "general will." 12 For Rawls, a well-ordered society should never feature incorrigible political conflict between reasonable
persons, at least as regards constitutional essentials, because all reasonable persons accept the requirements of public reason, and although
"there are many nonpublic reasons [there is] but one public reason" (p.
220). Therefore, the bewildering plurality of moral belief found in such
a culture should in principle give rise to a satisfyingly monistic note of
reasonable consensus on all truly fundamental political questions. The
liberal conundrum dissolves when we understand that citizens may "by
their vote properly exercise their coercive political power over one another" (p. 217) only to force all reasonable citizens to accept what their
own reasonable comprehensive beliefs should have affirmed for themthat is, if they would but see what their own beliefs actually require them
to affirm. And if people insist on being unreasonable, then the neo3
Rousseauian liberal can in good faith compel them to be otherwise.'
Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and
irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their
case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society. (P. xvi.)
Obviously the crucial question then becomes, how do we determine the
content of those essentials of a democratic regime that the idea of public
reason requires all adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines to
acknowledge? Here we can turn for guidance to Rawls's discussion of
public reason and its application to one of the very few discussions of an
actual political dispute found within the pages of PoliticalLiberalism.
Rawls gives the following account of the requirements of public
reason:
12. "[P]ublic reason with its duty of civility gives a view about voting on fundamental
questions [that is] in some ways reminiscent of Rousseau's Social Contract. He saw voting as
ideally expressing our opinion as to which of the alternatives best advances the common
good" (pp. 219-20).
18. Joseph de Maistre argued that "the inevitable consequence of faith in the

principles of Rousseau is a situation in which the people is told by its masters ' "You believe
that you don't want this law, but we assureyou thatyou do. If you dare reject it, we shall shoot you
down in order to punishyou for not wanting what you do want" and they then do so.'" Berlin,
Origins of Fascism, supra note 1,at 150.

1994]

SECULAR FUNDAMENTALISM

1819

[I] t is only in this way [by accepting the dictates of public reason],
and by accepting that politics in a democratic society can never
be guided by what we see as the whole truth, that we can realize
the ideal expressed by the principle of legitimacy: to live politically with others in the light of reasons all might reasonably be
expected to endorse. What public reason asks is that citizens be
able to explain their votes to one another in terms of a reasonable balance of public political values, it being understood by
everyone that of course the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens is thought by them to provide further and often transcendent backing for those values. In each
case, which doctrine is affirmed is a matter of conscience for the
individual citizen. It is true that the balance of political values
that a citizen holds must be reasonable, and one that can be
seen to be reasonable by other citizens; but not all reasonable
balances are the same. The only comprehensive doctrines that
run afoul of public reason are those that cannot support a reasonable balance of political values. Yet given that the doctrines
actually held support a reasonable balance, how could anyone
complain? What would be the objection? (P. 243.)
This passage makes an extraordinary claim: those who hold comprehensive doctrines that cannot support a reasonable balance of political
values on a particular issue have no grounds to complain when public
reason rules against them because, after all, other comprehensive doctrines do manage to support a reasonable balance of political values; and
if a comprehensive doctrine is, as a general matter, truly reasonable, it
will recognize the need to give way in these circumstances. What is truly
extraordinary is the assumption that the answer to the question of
whether or not a comprehensive doctrine supports a reasonable balance
of political values on some particular question will itself be sufficiently
transparent so as to provide a satisfactory answer to those whose comprehensive doctrines do not, in the interpreter's opinion, support such a
reasonable balance.
The extraordinary nature of this assumption is magnified by Rawls's
vague definition of reasonableness. Rawls defines the reasonable as "the
willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation" and the "willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences" for the use of public reason (p. 49). By the "burdens of judgment" Rawls simply means that, given the epistemological problems
inherent in moral and political reasoning, we must acknowledge the validity of the disagreements that can arise among reasonable persons (pp.
54-58). The "willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation" is more problematic. Whether it has any substance beyond signalling that the reasonable is not limited to rational choice means-ends anal-
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ysis depends on how much content is given to the term "fair."14 Yet even
if "fair" is read as Rawls defines it within the context ofjustice as fairness
in A Theory ofJustice, this former definition is, as many critics have noted,
so indeterminate that it gives the reader almost no guidance as to what,
on any particular political question, a reasonable balance of political values might entail. 15 Just how remarkable Rawls's views are in regard to the
interpretation and resolution of profound political disagreement in a
pluralistic culture becomes clear when he elaborates with a rare concrete
example:
As an illustration, consider the troubled question of abortion.
•.. Suppose... that we consider the question in terms of three
important political values: the due respect for human life, the
ordered reproduction of political society over time, including
the family in some form, and finally the equality of women as
equal citizens. (There are, of course, other important political
values besides these.) Now I believe any reasonable balance of these
three values will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether
or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester. The reasonfor
this is that at this early stage of pregnancy the politicalvalue of equality
of women is overriding and this right is required to give it substance
and force.16 Other political values, if tallied in, would not, I
think, affect this conclusion. A reasonable balance may allow
her such a right beyond this, at least in certain circumstances.
However, I do not discuss the question in general here, as I simply want to illustrate the point in the text by saying that any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding
that duly qualifiedright in thefirst trimester is to that extent unreasonable .... (P. 243 n.32) (emphasis added).
It seems that, for Rawls, "reason" and "reasonable" fill the lexical space
that in many other discourses would be filled by "God," or "the scriptures," or "moral insight."17 The concept of the reasonable becomes for
14. In Political Liberalism, Rawls describes how A Theoy of Justice mischaracterized
justice as fairness as a theory of rational decision. He now insists on maintaining a material

distinction between "the reasonable" and "the rational" (pp. 48-54).
15. See, e.g., Benjamin R. Barber, Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology,

Measurement and Politics in Rawls, 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 663 (1975).
Rawls concedes that the precedence of liberty comes into play only after "a
certain level of wealth has been attained," and that below this threshold, liberty
may not only have to be weighted against but perhaps subordinated to other
primary goods in whose absence freedom has no meaning. Depending on where
the threshold is established, even Marx might be comfortable with such a
viewpoint!
Id. at 667 n.9 (citation omitted).
16. Readers who are sympathetic to abortion rights might want to consider the
intellectual cogency of the following variation on Rawls's argument: The reason why
abortion must be prohibited is that at every stage of the pregnancy the political value of
the due respect for human life is overriding, and this prohibition is required to give that
value substance and force.
17. This cryptic invocation of the term "reasonable" has a distinguished pedigree in
legal academic circles. See 4 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1415
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Rawls what Kenneth Burke calls a "God term"; and the characteristics of
this god remain, as perhaps befits its metaphysical status, somewhat mysterious.' 8 That is, "reason" functions as the master concept that. transcends the enumeration of particular reasons: invoking "reason" becomes
equivalent to giving reasons. The breathtaking circularity of this argument illustrates how a discourse that presents itself as a model of rational
explication is, rationally speaking, indistinguishable from the tautological
or emotive language games upon which the coherence theorist and the
moral intuitionist must more openly rely.
How then can we account for the startling disjunction between the
obvious plasticity of Rawis's definitional structure, and the certainty with
which he states what public reason requires in the case of such a divisive
issue as abortion? Moreover, what is the source of the author's apparent
belief that his Delphic utterance as to what a reasonable balance of political values requires regarding this "troubled question" will be accepted by
those whose comprehensive doctrines would in his view support an "unreasonable" balance? The answer, I believe, can be found by historicizing
the particular brand of political liberalism that has become the dominant
ideology among much of the American intelligentsia.

III. TOLERANCE

AND

DoGMA

Rawls notes in his introduction that political liberalism developed in
reaction to the Reformation and its aftermath. After the savage religious
wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European civilization
discovered "a new social possibility: the possibility of a reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society" (p. xxv). Before then, it seemed natural to believe that "social unity and concord require[d] agreement on a
general and comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine"
(p. xxv). Rawls offers the plausible hypothesis that religious toleration
developed because "it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe in the damnation of those with whom we have, with trust and confidence, long and
fruitfully cooperated in maintaining a just society" (p. xxv). This is an
important point: if a culture truly believes that the roads to both heavenly
salvation and eternal perdition are known and are accessible through acts
(tentative ed. 1958) ("[The court] should assume... that the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.")
18. [M]any of [our] 'observations' are but implications of the particular
terminology in terms of which the observations are made ...Perhaps the simplest
illustration of this point is to be got by contrasting secular and theological
terminologies of motives. If you want to operate, like a theologian, with a
terminology that includes 'God' as its key term, the only sure way to do so is to
put in the term, and that's that. The Bible solves the problem by putting 'God'

into the first sentence-and from this initial move, many implications
'necessarily' follow . . . I have called metaphysics 'coy theology' because the
metaphysician often introduces the term 'God' not outright, as with the Bible,
but by beginning with a term that ambiguously contains such implications.
Kenneth Burke, Language As Symbolic Action 46 (1966).
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of human will, then almost any measure to maintain individuals and nations on the path of deliverance will not seem merely justifiable, but will
become a sacred duty. Liberalism, with its initial tolerance for many versions of truth, arises in part as a response to the decay of belief in a particular truth. It becomes, we might say, the faith of those who have lost
their faith.1 9
Liberalism appeared in Europe as both a symptom and a cause of the
collapse of various religious and sociopolitical orthodoxies. As liberalism
gradually established itself as the legitimate ideology of the Enlightenment, various liberal theories adopted differentjustifications for rejecting
the older sources of dogmatic authority. Most versions of liberalism share
some set of methodological assumptions about truth being best served
through an exchange or clash of opinions. 20 Yet beyond this common
commitment to what might be termed tolerance as a methodological precondition, different types of modem liberalism rely on quite disparate
justifications for allowing the propagation of what are believed to be false
religious, philosophical, and political claims. At the risk of speaking too
schematically, we can perhaps discern three general types of liberalism in
postindustrial societies. (These of course overlap with each other, and
produce many hybrids and variants.) PoliticalLiberalism distinguishes itself from two of them, and exemplifies the third.
One variety of liberalism finds its roots in a general skepticism about
the entire concept of "truth" as applied to all types of value statements.
Ontological skeptics doubt that statements of value are anything other
19. Isaiah Berlin describes the preliberal attitude toward dissent:
[W]hat Catholic in, let us say, the sixteenth century would say 'I abhor the heresies
of the reformers, but I am deeply moved by the sincerity and integrity with which
they hold and practice and sacrifice themselves for their abominable beliefs?' On
the contrary, the deeper the sincerity of such heretics ... the more dangerous
they are, the more likely to lead souls to perdition, the more ruthlessly they
should be eliminated, since heresy-false beliefs about the ends of men-is
surely a poison more dangerous to the health of society than even hypocrisy or
dissimulation, which at least do not openly attack the true doctrine. Only truth
matters: to die in a false cause is wicked or pitiable.
See Isaiah Berlin, The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will, in The Crooked Timber of
Humanity, supra note 1, at 207, 208.
20. Despite the attraction that this belief holds for us as properly socialized liberal
subjects, we should note that as a methodological generalization, the heuristic value of the
"marketplace of ideas" has its limits. Almost everyone will admit that there are times when
truth is best served by suppressing the dissemination of patently false views, and all liberal
political systems acknowledge this in various ways. Libel law is an obvious case in point; the
permeable border between what First Amendment doctrine defines as "speech" or
"conduct" is perhaps a more interesting example. See Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and
Scholarship, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 817, 842-45 (1993) (arguing that for the purposes of First
Amendment doctrine the distinction between speech and conduct is essentially
manipulable and that the distinction is employed as a rhetorical device by courts when they
determine which speech acts will or will not be permitted). For a more general treatment
of this theme see Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech, And It's a Good
Thing Too (1994).

19941

SECULAR FUNDAMENTALISM

1823

than statements about subjective preferences. Epistemological skeptics,
by contrast, believe that no way exists to determine adequately the objective status, if any, of such value claims. Both kinds of skeptics have good
reasons-to the extent that this phrase means anything for a moral skeptic-for objecting to the social imposition of a particular "truth" on those
who dissent from it. Given that moral skepticism is perhaps the most
distinctive feature of modernity, it is only natural that it has come to be
the basis for much of the support for liberalism in the modern world.
PoliticalLiberalism refuses to rely on this justification, as indeed it
must if it is to avoid imposing its own comprehensive doctrine on those
whose comprehensive doctrines reject skepticism:
Political liberalism does not question that many political and
moral judgments of certain specified kinds are correct and it
views many of them as reasonable. Nor does it question the possible truth of affirmations of faith. Above all, it does not argue
that we should be hesitant and uncertain, much less skeptical,
about our own beliefs. Rather, we are to recognize the practical
impossibility of reaching reasonable and workable political
agreement in judgment on the truth of comprehensive doctrines, especially an agreement that might serve the political
purpose, say, of achieving peace and concord in a society characterized by religious and philosophical differences. (P. 63.)
This statement might be understood to imply another reason for tolerating what those who wield political power sincerely believe are deeply mistaken and perhaps socially pernicious views on matters of fundamental
importance. If the nature of a pluralistic society makes reaching agreement on certain issues a practical impossibility, then prudence might well
dictate that we not even attempt to create any sort of robust consensus on
such questions. This brand of prudential or pragmatic liberalism argues
that, given the morally fragmented quality of modern life, moral consensus on many questions could only be achieved through coercive measures
that would inflict severe damage on the basic interests of the individuals
and groups being coerced: a result which would be both bad in itself, and
which would ultimately undermine the very consensus that the measures
were designed to produce. On this view, liberalism operates as a kind of
necessary modus vivendi within cultures that have lost the moral or religious coherence that would properly allow for the subordination of individual or group interests to the demands of a single comprehensive political doctrine.
Despite what the passage quoted above might seem to suggest, Rawls
does not endorse this understanding of liberalism any more than he endorses a conception of liberalism grounded in a morally skeptical view of
the world. For him, the overlapping consensus that enables a well-ordered society to answer the most basic questions of political obligation
through the use of public reason-rather than through recourse to any
comprehensive doctrine-is not the product of any mere prudential or
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pragmatic compromise. This overlapping consensus is itself the social instantiation of liberalism as a kind of fundamental moral view:
A typical use of the phrase "modus vivendi" is to characterize a
treaty between two states whose national aims and interests put
them at odds. In negotiating a treaty each state would be wise
and prudent to make sure that the agreement proposed represents an equilibrium point [between their respective interests].
.. That an overlapping consensus is quite different from a modus vivendi is clear... [for] the object of the consensus, the
political conception ofjustice, is itself a moral conception. And
...it is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it includes conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as well as principles of
justice, and an account of the political virtues through which
those principles are embodied in human character and expressed in public life. An overlapping consensus, therefore, is
not merely a consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on
complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on
a convergence of self or group interests. All those who affirm
the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral
grounds it provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds does not make their affirming
it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the case may be,
since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their
affirmation. (P. 147-48.)
Rawls's vision of liberalism, then, is neither skeptical nor pragmatic;
it is instead an example of what can be called secular fundamentalism.
The secular fundamentalist asserts that the supreme political value is to
produce a political system that accepts liberal principles of political morality as embodiments of the supreme political value. The exclusion of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines from the idea of public reason is
then justified on the grounds that those reasonable comprehensive doctrines are reasonable only to the extent that they acknowledge that the
role of ajust political system is "to enable all members of society to make
mutually acceptable to one another their shared institutions and basic
arrangements, by citing what are publicly recognized as sufficient reasons." 2 ' This variety of liberalism is properly understood as fundamen21. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. Phil. 515, 561 (1980).
A significant ambiguity in Rawls's account concerns who should, as a practical matter, have
the power to determine what counts as "run[ning] afoul of public reason," and what
consequences, if any, should flow from such a determination. That is, if his prescriptions
are merely precatory, we might want to ask what relevance they have to the political
realities of "actually existing liberalism." On the other hand, if-as his comments on
judicial review as an embodiment of public reason suggest-the account entails that some
anti-democratic institution have the ultimate power to determine what public reason in
fact requires, then we have reason to worry that the author's supreme confidence
concerning his ability to discern what he believes are the right answers to such questions
will be replicated in the opinions of those appointed to safeguard the exercise of "public
reason" (pp. 231-40).
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talist in the sense that it denies the possible legitimacy of deep political
conflict in what it considers a just social order. The overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is held to produce the authoritative (and authoritarian) voice of a public reason that speaks ex cathedra,
thereby eliminating the possibility of true conceptual incommensurability
and its discursive offspring, interminable moral disagreement.
The irony, of course, is that in this triumphalist incarnation liberalism can begin to resemble the very dogmatic systems that it once rebelled against.2 2 Despite its highly abstract endorsement of moral and

religious pluralism, PoliticalLiberalism is ultimately a paean to a secular
creed that has within it the potential to become every bit as monistic,
compulsory, and intolerant of any significant deviation from social verities as the traditional modes of belief it derided and displaced.
IV.

THE LEIsuRE OF THE THEORY CLASS

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that Plato's Republic, which is
usually taken as the very model of an empty ideal, did nothing more than
conceptualize the nature of Greek mores at the time. 23 Hegel's point is
that Plato's utopian vision of the ideal political community was a product
of the philosopher's struggle to come to terms with the actual conditions
of the contemporary Greek state. The polis ruled by philosopher kings
represents Plato's imaginative attempt to resolve what was perhaps the
fundamental cultural crisis of fourth century Hellenic society: the conflict between a longing for the traditional organic community of an idealized past, and what social conservatives such as Plato saw as the chaotic
individualism and impiety of the Greek present.
Perhaps the most common criticism of Rawls's work has been that
the stripped-down subjects of the original position are themselves "the
very model of an empty ideal"-that such an asocial conception of persons as radically distinct from their ends is both metaphysically incoherent and sociologically absurd.2 4 These criticisms have much force. What
they overlook is the extent to which the antiskeptical and nonpragmatic
strains of liberal ideology actually produce the sorts of stripped-down sub22. If this resemblance seems implausible, consider how two other recent books by
prominent liberal intellectuals have gone about addressing the abortion controversy. Like
Rawis, Laurence Tribe and Ronald Dworkin emphasize the great and apparently
intractable moral and political struggles that the Supreme Court's decisions in this area
have occasioned. Yet all three writers reach the conclusion that a principled policy which
adequately addresses the legitimate concerns of all parties is not merely available: in their
view, such an ideal outcome is actually instantiated by the extant constitutional orthodoxy.
See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 168-72 (1993); Laurence Tribe, Abortion: The
Clash of Absolutes 204-08 (1990). The moral hubris of an established faith could hardly
go further than this.
23. See Hegel's Philosophy of Right 10 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952).
24. See Sandel, Liberalism, supra note 7, and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice
(1983) for representative criticisms of the assumptions concerning the nature of
personhood and of society that A Theory ofJustice seemed to imply.
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jects who find the remarkably impoverished vision of a pluralistic political
community presented in PoliticalLiberalism both plausible and attractive.
What can one say to the modem liberal intellectual who writes that abortion cannot be prohibited in the first trimester because "any reasonable
balance" of political values requires recognizing such a right, and then
"explains" this conclusion by pointing out that "at this early stage of pregnancy the political value of the equality of women is overriding, and this
right is required to give it substance and force?" Such persons can no
more be argued with than those who simply declare that a particular result is required because "God says so."25 Yet at least the religious fundamentalist is alluding to a rich cultural and intellectual tradition that
might give some warrant for believing that statements about "rights" and
"values" have some kind of metaphysical significance. Liberal ideologues,
who celebrate tolerance and pluralism while at the same time condemning any meaningful dissent from their own thin idea of the good as not
merely wrong, but contrary to the dictates of reason itself, cannot invoke
even this meager excuse.
It involves a considerable oversimplification to say that the academic
deployment of empty signifiers such as "the reasonable" in ways that gratif), the moral prejudices of upper-class liberal intellectuals should be understood in sociological terms. Still, consider the following passage from
the Introduction to PoliticalLiberalism:
I acknowledge a special debt . . . [rio Ronald Dworkin and

Thomas Nagel for many conversations while taking part in seminars at New York University during 1987-1991; and in connection with the idea ofjustice as fairness as a freestanding view, a
rare illuminating midnight conversation in the deserted bar of
the Santa Lucia Hotel in Napoli in June 1988. (P. xxxi.)
No one with any interest in contemporary jurisprudence can have failed
to notice how Ronald Dworkin's work has both drawn upon and influenced Rawls's own writings. The similarities between Law's Empire and
the essays that are now collected in PoliticalLiberalism are especially striking. Indeed, Dworkin's central claim that "law as integrity" consists of
making the relevant materials congruent with the best public values 26 is
echoed by Rawls's belief that "in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the reason of its supreme court" and that "the
supreme court is the branch of government that serves as the exemplar of
public reason" (p. 231). Law as integrity parallels the idea of public reason legitimating the exercise of coercive state power "in accordance with
25. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2053, 2069-70 (1993):
In this discursive world, the identity and the ontological status of the main terms
and the main grammar are at once almost always beyond question, and yet almost
always dramatically underspecified.... Among the appropriate legal academic
audience, the invocation of these terms, in accordance with their usual
accompanying grammar, will, with surprising frequency, simply arrestthought upon
impact.
26. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 225-27, 254-58 (1986).
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a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them
as reasonable and rational" (p. 137). As a formal matter, these concepts
can accommodate any imaginable substantive outcome;2 7 in practice,
both ideas are understood by their authors as requiring essentially the
same narrow range of politically controversial results.
This convergence is not particularly shocking if we consider the social factors that in the end give content to such otherwise infinitely pliable concepts as "integrity," "reason," and "principle." The academic subjects who benefit from illuminating midnight conversations in the bars of
fancy European hotels work at the same institutions, attend the same conferences, read the same newspapers, live in the same suburbs, and send
their children to the same schools as their eminently reasonable interlocutors. Is it then so surprising that the servants of Law's Empire end up
replicating the considered moral judgments handed down within the hermetic confines of Law's Reading Group?

27. See Pierre Schlag, Contradiction and Denial, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1216, 1221 (1989)
("[T]ry as one may, it still remains a mystery exactly what it is that is really ruled out by
Dworkin's invitation to try and make of the legal materials, the best they can be.").

